Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 108 | Issue 4

Article 2

Fall 2018

Principles of Pretrial Release: Reforming Bail
Without Repeating its Harms
Brook Hopkins
Chiraag Bains
Colin Doyle

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
Recommended Citation
Brook Hopkins, Chiraag Bains, and Colin Doyle, Principles of Pretrial Release: Reforming Bail Without Repeating its Harms, 108 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 679 (2018).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol108/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons.

0091-4169/19/10804-0679
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
Copyright © 2019 by Brook Hopkins, Chiraag Bains & Colin Doyle

Vol. 108, No. 4
Printed in U.S.A.

PRINCIPLES OF PRETRIAL RELEASE:
REFORMING BAIL WITHOUT REPEATING
ITS HARMS
BROOK HOPKINS
CHIRAAG BAINS
COLIN DOYLE*
Bail reform is happening. Across the country, jurisdictions are
beginning to recognize that contemporary pretrial systems rooted in money
bail are discriminatory, ineffective, and (by and large) unconstitutional. A
common and substantial component of contemporary reforms is an
increased reliance on conditional release as an alternative to pretrial
incarceration.
In many ways, conditional release represents an
improvement over money bail, but the practice of conditional release has its
own pitfalls.
This Article identifies unforeseen and unplanned harms that can result
from a system of conditional release and proposes five principles that
jurisdictions can follow to eliminate or mitigate these harms. As the
options for pretrial conditions continue to expand, judges may impose more
conditions than are necessary, including conditions that are burdensome
and ineffective. Because pretrial monitoring is inexpensive—especially
when subsidized by user fees for pretrial monitoring—there is a risk that
courts will impose monitoring and other conditions on people who would
previously have been released without conditions. Taken together, these
harms can prolong people’s involvement in the criminal justice system,
restrict their liberty in profound ways, set them up for pretrial
incarceration through technical violations, and saddle them with
unaffordable debts.
To responsibly use conditional release without replicating the harms
of money bail, jurisdictions should adopt the following five principles. One,
*

Brook Hopkins is the Executive Director of the Criminal Justice Policy Program at Harvard
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release on recognizance should be the norm and conditional release the
exception. Two, the principle of parsimony should guide decisions over
what conditions of release to impose—meaning that burdens placed on
defendants and restrictions of their liberty should not exceed the legitimate
interests of the government. Three, conditions should be minimal, related
to the charged conduct, and proportionate to the risk of flight and pretrial
criminal activity. Four, jurisdictions should not charge fees for conditional
release, pretrial services, or pretrial monitoring. Five, restrictions on
pretrial liberty should be evidence-based.
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INTRODUCTION
In most jurisdictions in the United States, someone accused of a crime
and awaiting trial is either released from jail or detained indefinitely
because they cannot afford to pay money bail. Those who can afford to
post bail—however dangerous they are, however high their risk of flight—
get released. Those who cannot afford to post bail—even if they pose no
danger to the community and are a sure bet to return for court—remain
detained.1 Under this pretrial system, it is better to be guilty, dangerous,
and rich than to be innocent, harmless, and poor. America’s discriminatory
pretrial practices contribute to mass incarceration at great expense. Pretrial
detention costs the United States approximately $14 billion each year,2 and
1

See generally HARVARD LAW SCH. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, MOVING
BEYOND MONEY: A PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM (2016), available at http://cjpp.law.harvard
.edu/assets/FINAL-Primer-on-Bail-Reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/E247-U6GM] [hereinafter
CJPP BAIL REFORM PRIMER] (presenting findings that money bail has been shown to unfairly
disadvantage people who cannot afford it).
2
PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL JUSTICE: HOW MUCH DOES IT COST?, at 2 (2017),
available at https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ash
x?DocumentFileKey=4c666992-0b1b-632a-13cb-b4ddc66fadcd [https://perma.cc/U983-GP
GW].
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the increase in pretrial detention over the last few decades accounts for all
of the net jail growth in the United States during that time.3 On any given
day, around half a million people are incarcerated having only been
accused—not convicted—of a crime.4 Empirical research has also found
that “[H]ispanic and black defendants are more likely to be detained
[pretrial] than similarly situated white defendants.”5
Justice system actors and Americans at large are coming to view the
money bail system as unfair and unwise.6 To lower jail populations and
provide equal treatment under the law, advocates are pushing a variety of
reforms: procedural protections for preventive detention, cite-and-release
standards, risk assessment tools, and the expansion of pretrial services, to
name a few. Jurisdictions are increasingly looking to pretrial monitoring as
an alternative to pretrial incarceration. As states and counties expand
pretrial services, and as technologies such as GPS tracking and remote
alcohol monitoring become more common, many courts now have a
broader range of pretrial conditions at their disposal than the familiar
options of detention, release on recognizance, or release on money bail.
On ethical, constitutional, and policy grounds, a system of conditional
release is better than a system of jailing people on unaffordable bail without
due process of law. But the expansion of pretrial release conditions carries
its own pitfalls. One danger is that courts will impose conditions not only
upon people whom the court would otherwise have detained, but also upon
people whom the court would have otherwise released on recognizance.
Another danger is that courts will underuse simple, effective conditions like
phone call reminders for court dates, while overusing burdensome
conditions such as drug testing, drug monitoring, in-person reporting, and

3

Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, Prison Policy Initiative, Mass Incarceration: The
Whole Pie 2018, at 6 (2018), available at https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018.html
[https://perma.cc/56LY-SNZG].
4
Id. at 2.
5
Stephen Demuth & Darrell Steffensmeier, The Impact of Gender and Race-Ethnicity in
the Pretrial Release Process, 51 SOC. PROBS. 222, 222 (2004).
6
See, e.g., Editorial Board, Fixing the Unfair Bail System is Worth the Costs, WASH.
POST (Sept. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fixing-the-unfair-bailsystem-is-worth-the-costs/2017/09/09/ff3c5c4c-73eb-11e7-8f39-eeb7d3a2d304_story.html?
utm_term=.a158e99985d7 [https://perma.cc/CLH6-ZRKW]; Editorial Board, Cash Bail’s
Lonely Defender, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/25/opi
nion/cash-bails-lonely-defender.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6DE3-P4AU]; Times Editorial
Board, How the Poor Get Locked Up and the Rich Go Free, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-bail-reform-20170816-story,amp.html
[https://perma.cc/XSK6-7RKJ].

682

HOPKINS, BAINS & DOYLE

[Vol. 108

GPS bracelets.7 Jurisdictions may also seek to pass on the costs of pretrial
monitoring to defendants by imposing fees to pay for drug testing, alcohol
monitoring, and geolocation tracking. The overuse of conditions of release
and the charging of fees can restrict people’s liberty, prolong their
involvement with the criminal justice system, and lead to technical
violations of pretrial release, which in turn can result in revocation of
release and imposition of jail time. In short, unnecessary release conditions
and fees can set people up to fail and can replicate some of the harms of
money bail.
This Article suggests a framework of five principles that jurisdictions
should adopt to fairly and responsibly administer pretrial conditional
release. First, consistent with the Supreme Court’s admonition that “liberty
is the norm” pretrial,8 judges should maximize the use of release on one’s
own recognizance, imposing conditions only when truly necessary to
prevent or deter flight and criminal activity. Second, the decision of what
release conditions to impose should be governed by the principle of
parsimony, which holds that punishment and deprivation of liberty should
not exceed the legitimate interest of the state. Third, conditions should be
the least restrictive possible, related to the charged conduct, and
proportionate to the risk of flight and pretrial criminal activity. Conditions
of release should be aimed at supporting, rather than supervising, the
accused. Very few defendants willfully abscond pretrial; more often, they
fail to appear because they lose track of their court date, lack transportation,
or have competing work, family, and childcare obligations.9 Pretrial
services should be centered on positive interventions—such as phone or
text reminders of court dates and transportation to court—rather than
punitive deterrents—such as unnecessary drug testing and revocation.
Fourth, jurisdictions should avoid charging fees for pretrial services, as
these can create untenable pressure on poor defendants and their families,
result in unnecessary incarceration when they are unable to pay, and
exacerbate wealth and racial disparities. Pretrial justice is a public good
that should be funded collectively by taxpayers. Fifth, dovetailing with the
See generally CHICAGO CMTY. BOND FUND, PUNISHMENT IS NOT A “SERVICE”: THE
INJUSTICE OF PRETRIAL CONDITIONS IN COOK COUNTY (2017), available at https://chicago
bond.org/docs/pretrialreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/BRN8-HGZ7] (arguing that pretrial
release conditions in Cook County have become increasingly punitive as more people are
being diverted from jail).
8
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
9
See, e.g., CTY. OF SANTA CLARA BAIL & RELEASE WORK GRP., FINAL CONSENSUS
REPORT ON OPTIMAL PRETRIAL JUSTICE, at 2 (2016), available at https://www.sccgov.
org/sites/ceo/Documents/final-consensus-report-on-optimal-pretrial-justice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U7PQ-NE8Y].
7
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principle of parsimony, any restrictions on pretrial liberty should be
evidence-based. Too often, jurisdictions routinely impose conditions
without studying whether those conditions actually improve pretrial
outcomes.10
I. PRINCIPLE 1: MAXIMIZE RELEASE ON RECOGNIZANCE
In a functioning pretrial system that obeys the constitutional
requirement that “liberty is the norm” pretrial,11 judges should maximize
the use of release on one’s own recognizance. The default rule should be to
release pretrial defendants on recognizance. As jurisdictions move away
from money bail, they are likely to adopt risk assessment tools and
additional forms of conditional release, including drug testing, electronic
monitoring, mental health treatment, and more. Conditional release should
be understood as a restriction on pretrial liberty and should only be imposed
when the prosecution has proved by clear and convincing evidence that it is
necessary to prevent flight and secure public safety. Risk assessment tools
should be calibrated to recommend release on recognizance as the default
pretrial outcome.
Most jurisdictions have statutes or court rules that require judges to
impose “the least restrictive condition[s]” determined to reasonably assure
the defendant’s appearance at trial and public safety.12 This least restrictive
condition is usually release on recognizance, which requires that someone
accused of a crime promise to return to court and not commit a crime while
on release. That is enough of a condition for most people, as the evidence
bears out. In jurisdictions that have implemented reforms that result in
releasing most people on recognizance, the overwhelming majority of those
people have shown up for court dates and have not committed crimes on
release.13 To impose conditions that restrict liberty beyond release on
10
Kristin Bechtel et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Pretrial Research: Risk Assessment,
Bond Type, and Interventions, 42 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 443, 461 (2017) (noting general lack of
quantitative data regarding interventions from pretrial services).
11
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755.
12
E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2a:162-16.
13
For example, in Santa Clara County, which has taken steps to rely less on money bail
and release more people pretrial, more than 95% of defendants reappear in court. See CTY.
OF SANTA CLARA BAIL AND RELEASE WORK GRP., supra note 9, at 46. Washington, D.C.
releases 94% of defendants pretrial, PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR D.C., RELEASE RATES
FOR PRETRIAL DEFENDANTS WITHIN WASHINGTON, DC (2017), https://www.psa.g
ov/sites/default/files/2016%20Release%20Rates%20for%20DC%20Pretrial%20Defendants
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6STE-TNYQ], and 90% of them make their court dates, COURT
SERVS. & OFFENDER SUPERVISION AGENCY FOR D.C., FY 2016 AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT
27 (2016), available at https://www.csosa.gov/about/financial/afr/FY2016-CSOSA-AFR.pdf
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recognizance, the government should have the burden of proving by clear
and convincing evidence that a restriction on liberty is necessary.
Jurisdictions should calibrate pretrial processes to accelerate the
release of people who are unlikely to flee or harm others. Some
jurisdictions have introduced procedures that allow such people to be
released from jail on their recognizance without a hearing before a judge. 14
Commonly in these jurisdictions, a pretrial services agency has been
granted the authority to identify people who are low-risk and to release
them.15 Other jurisdictions have adopted policies that encourage the police
to issue a summons rather than arrest someone who is likely to be released
on recognizance.16
As jurisdictions continue to expand pretrial services as an alternative
to jailing people, more conditions of release will become available.
Because many conditions of release are relatively inexpensive for the
government, there is a risk that judges will impose conditions of release on
people whom the judges previously would have released on personal
recognizance. On a per-defendant basis, operating pretrial services is much
cheaper for local governments than operating jails, especially when
jurisdictions require defendants to pay the cost of electronic monitoring or
drug testing (a problematic arrangement, as we explain below with respect
to Principle 4). To use one example, it costs Los Angeles County less than
$26 per day to monitor someone pretrial, but $177 per day to incarcerate
that person.17 Thus, if the available budget for incarcerating and monitoring
people pretrial were to remain constant, Los Angeles County could afford
to monitor up to seven times as many people as the county could afford to
incarcerate.
Release on recognizance should remain the default pretrial disposition,
even as more release options become available and even if monitoring more
[https://perma.cc/MJK6-4R4V]. Data from 2012 through 2016 show that each year between
88% and 90% of people released while awaiting trial remained arrest-free. Id. Each year,
between 98% and 99% of released defendants were not arrested for violent crimes. Id.
14
See, e.g., B. Scott West, The Next Step in Pretrial Release Is Here: The Administrative
Release Program, THE ADVOCATE, at 1 (Jan. 2017), https://dpa.ky.gov/Public_Defender
_Resources/The%20Advocate/Advocate%20Newsletter%20Jan%202017%20(COLOR%20%20FINAL).pdf [https://perma.cc/R2QF-MNU2] (discussing the Non-Financial Uniform
Schedule of Bail Administrative Release Program in Kentucky).
15
See id.
16
See, e.g., N.J. JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND
LEGISLATURE 7–8 (2016), http://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2016cjrannual.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WG7H-BFWC].
17
SHEILA KUHL & HILDA SOLIS, MOTION BY SUPERVISORS SHEILA KUEHL AND HILDA
SOLIS ON BAIL REFORM at 3 (Mar. 8, 2017), http://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/supdocs/
112060.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XHC-VC3G].
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people is not burdensome for the government. The Constitution requires
liberty to be the norm pending trial.18 Conditional release should be
understood as a restriction of this pretrial liberty. Pretrial conditions—
especially when multiple conditions are imposed—can unnecessarily
burden a defendant’s ability to work, care for children, and meet financial
obligations. Most pretrial interventions restrict a defendant’s freedom.
Electronic monitoring and house arrest are the more obvious examples, but
even less restrictive requirements such as weekly in-person check-ins with
pretrial services can be difficult for people to meet given their other
commitments and resource limitations. Pretrial services are typically
located within or adjacent to downtown courthouses, sometimes far from
residential neighborhoods.19 After juggling a job, or multiple jobs, and
caring for children and family, a bus trip and meeting every week can strain
one’s time and finances. These restrictions on liberty should be imposed
only when necessary and when the restrictions have been proven to work.
As explored in Principle Five ,many pretrial conditions are imposed without
any idea of their effectiveness or any plans for measuring their worth.
If pretrial service agencies use tools or assessments to develop release
recommendations for judges, these tools should reflect a presumption of
unconditional release. Across the country, algorithmic risk assessment
tools are becoming a more common feature of pretrial service agencies.20
These tools often provide release recommendations to judges and pretrial
staff, encouraging them to detain, release, or impose conditions on a
particular person based on his or her level of risk as calculated by the tool.21
These recommendations should reflect the presumption in favor of
releasing defendants on their own recognizance. Although risk assessment
algorithms use historical data to predict someone’s likelihood of missing
court dates or being arrested pretrial, these predictions by themselves do not
(and cannot) determine whether someone should be released, released
conditionally, or detained. Release decisions can be informed by
18

Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755.
For example, Washington D.C.’s Pretrial Services Agency is located near a
courthouse on the National Mall. Location Directory, PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR D.C.,
https://www.psa.gov/?q=contact/location_directory [https://perma.cc/R3K2-NKZF].
20
PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE STATE OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA at 5–8 (2017),
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Document
FileKey=f9d452f6-ac5a-b8e7-5d68-0969abd2cc82&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/M76ZHCRK].
21
See, e.g., GLENN A. GRANT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR
AND THE LEGISLATURE FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2017 11–13, https://www.njcourts.gov/courts
/assets/criminal/2017cjrannual.pdf [https://perma.cc/3H6L-DSVT] (describing Decision
Making Framework (DMF) in New Jersey).
19
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quantitative data, but the decision to release or detain someone is a valuesbased decision. In jurisdictions with risk assessment tools, these valuesbased decisions are made by policymakers who calibrate how the risk
assessment tools translate risk levels into release recommendations. If risk
assessment tools are calibrated to tolerate only a low-level of risk, then
pretrial services will end up recommending pretrial incarceration or onerous
conditions of release for nearly all defendants. Instead, policymakers
should calibrate these tools such that they recommend release on
recognizance for the overwhelming majority of defendants.
II. PRINCIPLE 2: FOLLOW THE PRINCIPLE OF PARSIMONY
A useful starting point for thinking about the appropriate level of
supervision is the principle of parsimony. Parsimony is the idea that
penalties should be no more severe than necessary to serve the state’s
legitimate interests.22 In the sentencing context, the state’s legitimate
interests are retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.23
Sanctions that exceed these purposes are gratuitous.
The parsimony principle emerges from a recognition that punishment
involves harm, whether by the restraint on a person’s liberty or the
infliction of pain. The utilitarian Jeremy Bentham saw punishment as
“itself evil,” and therefore defensible only “in as far as it promises to
exclude some greater evil.”24 Enlightenment philosopher and criminologist
Cesare Beccaria insisted that punishment be “the minimum possible in the
given circumstances,”25 and William Blackstone likewise argued that “[t]he
method however of inflicting punishment ought always to be proportioned
to the particular purpose it is meant to serve, and by no means exceed it.”26
The value of parsimony is reflected throughout the law of American
punishment. Law professor Norval Morris articulated parsimony as a
“utilitarian and humanitarian” constraint on sentencing, and those limits on
punishment can be observed at work in state sentencing guidelines.27 In the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress codified the parsimony principle
in the requirement that federal courts “impose a sentence sufficient, but not
22

Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & JUST.
363, 364 (1997).
23
Id.; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010).
24
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 23 (1830).
25
CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS 113 (Richard
Bellamy ed., 1995).
26
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 13 (1769).
27
Frase, supra note 22, at 373–74 (1997) (quoting NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF
IMPRISONMENT 61 (1974) and discussing Minnesota’s sentencing guidelines).
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greater than necessary,” to serve the purposes of punishment.28 The same
doctrine underlies the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,
under which disproportionate penalties, such as the death penalty for nonhomicide crimes against persons29 and life without parole for nonhomicides crimes committed by juveniles,30 have been deemed cruel and
unusual. It is not surprising, then, that the seminal National Academies
report, The Growth of Incarceration in the United States, identified
parsimony as one of the core principles “that should inform the use of
incarceration and the role of prison in U.S. society.”31
There is no reason parsimony should be limited to the context of
punishment. Indeed, scholars have applied it to regulatory sanctions—
sanctions imposed for legitimate state purposes other than punishment32—
such as preventive detention.33 The application of parsimony to the pretrial
context is straightforward. Restrictions on an accused individual’s liberty,
whether by detention or release conditions, constitute harms that must be
limited to that which is necessary to serve the legitimate pretrial goals of
those restrictions: appearance in court and the safety of the community.34
28

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446, 437 (2008) (death penalty “not a
proportional punishment” for rape of child and “should not be expanded to instances where
the victim’s life was not taken”); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 584 (1977) (death penalty
is “grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment” for rape of adult).
30
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (noting that “[a] sentence lacking any legitimate
penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense” and concluding that
“[w]ith respect to life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, none of the goals
of penal sanctions that have been recognized as legitimate . . . provides an adequate
justification”).
31
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 323 (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western, & Steve
Redburn eds., 2014), available at https://doi.org/10.17226/18613 [https://perma.cc/WNL363T5] (“Punishments for crime, and especially lengths of prison sentences, should never be
more severe than is necessary to achieve the retributive or preventive purposes for which
they are imposed.”).
32
See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (distinguishing punitive
from regulatory sanctions). The Supreme Court has described pretrial detention under the
Bail Reform Act aimed at “preventing danger to the community” to be regulatory in nature.
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
33
See generally Carol Steiker, Proportionality as a Limit on Preventive Justice:
Promises and Pitfalls, in PREVENTION AND THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 194 (Andrew
Ashworth et al. eds., 2013) (discussing proportionality as a constraint on the use of
preventive detention).
34
NAT’L INST. OF CORR., A FRAMEWORK FOR PRETRIAL JUSTICE: ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF
AN EFFECTIVE PRETRIAL SYSTEM AND AGENCY 44 (2017), available at https://nicic.gov/
framework-pretrial-justice-essential-elements-effective-pretrial-system-and-agency [https://p
erma.cc/7TAE-LZDX].
29
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The federal Bail Reform Act explicitly required that judges release
individuals “subject to the least restrictive further condition, or combination
of conditions, that such judicial officer determines will reasonably assure
the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person
and the community.”35 Many state statutes include similar language,36 as
does the American Bar Association’s standards for pretrial release.37
However, in practice, across the country onerous pretrial conditions
are imposed on defendants without sufficient regard to their individual
circumstances or whether such conditions will actually serve the
government’s legitimate pretrial goals. Many courts require in-person
meetings with pretrial services officers, which are often time consuming
and inconvenient, even though “no good evidence” exists to show that these
meetings make a difference to appearance or rearrest rates.38 The District
of Columbia, which has virtually eliminated the use of money bail,
routinely requires drug testing of defendants despite repeated research
findings that drug testing does not reduce pretrial failure.39 Increasingly,
jurisdictions are also turning to electronic monitoring to surveil released
defendants.40 Such monitoring is expensive, can interfere with personal
relationships and employment opportunities, and tends to make individuals
feel “unfairly stigmatized.”41 And yet studies do not show that monitoring

35

18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B).
See Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE
L.J. 1344, 1395 n.229 (2014) (collecting state statutes).
37
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE § 10-5.2 (3d ed. 2007)
(“[T]he court should impose the least restrictive of release conditions necessary reasonably
to ensure the defendant’s appearance in court, protect the safety of the community or any
person, and to safeguard the integrity of the judicial process.”).
38
Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Bail Reform: New Directions for Pretrial
Detention and Release, 3 REFORMING CRIM. JUST. 42 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), http://academ
yforjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Reforming-Criminal-Justice_Vol_3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PD4W-UK94] (discussing studies).
39
MARIE VANNOSTRAND ET AL., STATE OF THE SCIENCE OF PRETRIAL RELEASE
RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUPERVISION 20–24 (2011), http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/acjc/bail%
20pretrial%20release/sciencepretrial.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W8JL-UMAW]
(reviewing
studies from the 1980s and 1990s in the District of Columbia, Arizona, Maryland, Oregon,
and Wisconsin, and summarizing that none of them “found empirical evidence that could be
used to demonstrate that when drug testing is applied to defendants as a condition of pretrial
release it is effective at deterring or reducing pretrial failure, even when a system of
sanctions is imposed”).
40
See CJPP BAIL PRIMER, supra note 1, at 17 (noting that the use of electronic
monitoring increased 32% between 2000 and 2014).
41
Id. (citing NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC MONITORING REDUCES RECIDIVISM 2
(2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/234460.pdf [https://perma.cc/XMR5-TTDF]).
36

2019]

PRINCIPLES OF PRETRIAL RELEASE

689

makes court appearance more likely or rearrest less likely. 42 In addition to
raising Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and due process
concerns,43 these intrusive conditions run afoul of the parsimony principle
because they do not appear to serve the state’s legitimate pretrial interests.
To be parsimonious, release conditions should be carefully targeted to
serve legitimate pretrial interests. Where less restrictive measures are
available and effective, they should be used. For example, at least for
defendants accused of public-order and otherwise low-level offenses,
clearer summons forms and court date reminders by text message can be an
effective way of ensuring appearance.44 Many people miss court dates not
because they are scofflaws, but because they do not understand their
summons, they forget about their court date, or they did not arrange for
leave from work or childcare in advance.45 For these defendants, the
imposition of more severe restraints on liberty would be unnecessary and,
being un-parsimonious, would constitute an abuse of government authority.
The use of unnecessary conditions can also have unforeseen harmful
consequences. Research indicates that over-supervision can make pretrial
failure more likely. For example, one study found that “lower-risk
defendants who were required to participate” in drug testing and treatment
“had higher failure rates than their lower-risk counterparts who were not.”46
In addition, undue restrictions could cause the public to lose faith in the
legal system. If people do not view the courts as fair, they may become less
42

See, e.g., VANNOSTRAND ET AL., supra note 39, at 24–27.
See United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 871–72 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that
suspicionless drug testing of pretrial supervisees constituted an unreasonable search where
the government failed to make either an individualized showing related to the defendant or
empirical support for a pattern of drug use leading to nonappearance); United States v.
Karper, 847 F. Supp. 2d 350, 363 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding that mandatory imposition of
curfew and electronic monitoring conditions on defendants accused of sex offenses violates
Due Process and Excessive Bail clauses); United States v. Polouizzi, 697 F. Supp. 2d 381,
395 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (same). But see United States v. Stephens, 594 F.3d 1033, 1041 (8th
Cir. 2010) (holding that such conditions do not facially violate the Due Process Clause).
44
See, e.g., BRICE COOKE ET AL., USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE OUTCOMES 4 (Jan. 2018) (finding that redesigning New York City’s summons form
to make the most important information stand out reduced failure to appear by 13% and text
message reminders reduced failure to appear by 26%), https://www.courthousenews.com
/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/crim-just-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WFF9-VJFY].
45
Id. at 6.
46
Kristin Bechtel et al., supra note 10, at 449 (citing Marie VanNostrand & Gena
Keebler, Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal Court, 73 FED. ARBITRATION 3, 5-6
(2009)). See also COMMISSION TO REFORM MARYLAND’S PRETRIAL SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT 14
(2014) (“over-supervision of low risk defendants produces poorer outcomes and wastes
resources”), http://goccp.maryland.gov/pretrial/documents/2014-pretrial-commission-finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/X94K-UZLX].
43
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likely to rely on the judicial system to seek redress or even less likely to
obey the law.47
Another benefit of the parsimony principle is that it can help prevent
pretrial services from becoming an arbitrary system of social control.
Through conditions of release, the government has the power to regulate a
person’s physical movement (travel restrictions and curfews), bodily
consumption (prohibitions on drug and alcohol use), and employment
activity (requirements to seek or maintain a job).48 But just because the
government can do these things, does not mean it should. Unless tailored to
an assessment of an individual’s risk of flight or danger to the community,
such restrictions look like government acting opportunistically to
manipulate the behavior of those who have come within the ambit of the
justice system, in service of the government’s general social policy goals.
Meanwhile, people not charged with crimes will be free to make their own
choices in these matters. Without parsimony, restrictions on pretrial liberty
will be arbitrary on some level.
Where police activity is concentrated in communities of color or the
criminal law is enforced disproportionately against racial minorities, the
harms of over-supervision are even greater. Racial disparities in the justice
system mean that pretrial supervision, if unnecessarily restrictive, may
replicate elements of previous forms of racial subordination.49 This has an
effect at the community level. Many communities of color are subject to
greater state involvement and reduced liberty because policing and

47
See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 25 (1968) (arguing that sentencing disproportionate to the offense creates “a risk of
either confusing morality or flouting it and bringing the law to contempt”); Tom R. Tyler &
Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legitimacy and the Exercise of Legal Authority: Motivating
Compliance, Cooperation and Engagement, 20 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 78, 86 (2014)
(“People who viewed legal authorities as more legitimate were more likely to report crime
and criminals . . . . They were also more likely to be willing to cooperate with the legal
system in prosecuting criminals . . . .”); Tom R. Tyler & Justin Sevier, How Do the Courts
Create Popular Legitimacy?: The Role of Establishing the Truth, Punishing Justly, and/or
Acting Through Just Procedures, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1095, 1104–05 (2014) (“Studies indicate
that people are both more likely to obey law and to accept decisions when they view the
courts as legitimate. This includes ordinary citizens following the laws and accepting
decisions related to rule breaking, disputes and misdemeanors, and criminals involved in
felony behaviors.”).
48
See CJPP BAIL PRIMER, supra note 1, at 5–6 (2016) (explaining how conditions of
release allow the government to control different aspects of an individual’s life).
49
See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (arguing that the modern criminal justice system has
replicated the harms of the era of Jim Crow segregation).
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prosecution have been concentrated there. Constraining pretrial conditions
with parsimony would prevent this effect from being even more severe.
III. PRINCIPLE 3: SUPPORT RATHER THAN SUPERVISE
Pretrial services agencies are tasked with helping defendants make
their court appearances and promoting public safety.50 A pretrial services
agency that focuses solely on monitoring defendants and reporting them for
failure to comply with their conditions of release will not be the most
effective at accomplishing these goals. Instead, a pretrial services agency
should use its various tools and interventions in a way that supports
defendants.
One challenge to maintaining a supportive, rather than supervisory,
approach is that around 40% of pretrial services agencies are located within
probation departments, which have a different mission.51 Whereas pretrial
services agencies work with individuals who are presumptively innocent,
probation departments work with adjudicated individuals who have fewer
rights and protections.52 And while pretrial services agencies have a limited
mission of assuring court appearance and protecting public safety,
probation departments engage in criminal sanction and offender
rehabilitation.53 To avoid conflating the different functions, it is crucial for
pretrial services agencies to maintain their independence, even if they work
under the umbrella of a probation department.54 The best practice is to
house pretrial services separately from probation.
Pretrial services agencies should avoid resorting to probationary
tactics because they risk setting defendants up for failure. In the probation
context, supervision has been shown to increase recidivism among
individuals who have an otherwise low risk of reoffending.55 This is in
large part because “the sheer number of [probation] requirements imposes a
nearly impossible burden on many offenders.”56 A similar consequence can
result in the pretrial context. When a defendant violates a condition of
50

See Nat’l Inst. of Corr., A Framework for Pretrial Justice: Essential Elements of an
Effective Pretrial System and Agency 44 (2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/
Library/032831.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3FS-BTAX].
51
See id. at 33.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Vincent Schiraldi, The Pennsylvania Community Corrections Story, COLUM. U. JUST.
LAB 6 (Apr. 25, 2018), http://justicelab.iserp.columbia.edu/img/PACommunityCorrections
4.19.18finalv3.pdf. [https://perma.cc/4DEH-LZ2J].
56
Cecelia Klingele, Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1015, 1035 (2013).
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release, he or she may be subject to rearrest, detention, and prosecution for
contempt of court—even though, in most cases, the conduct would be legal
absent the release condition.57 To avoid triggering these consequences,
pretrial services agencies should attempt to handle violations of conditions
of release administratively and invoke revocation proceedings only when
the conduct actually interfered with the court’s function or presented a risk
to public safety.58
One simple service that effectively increases court appearance without
overburdening defendants is automated phone-call reminders about
upcoming court dates. While automated or manual phone-call reminders
are common in other industries that seek to promote appearance rates—like
doctors’ and dentists’ offices—these reminders are only beginning to take
hold in our courts, despite being a proven, helpful tool. As a pioneer in
adopting phone-call reminders, Multnomah County, Oregon (which
includes Portland) ran a pilot program nearly a decade ago that placed
automatic calls to pretrial defendants to alert them of upcoming court
dates.59 The program lowered failure-to-appear rates by 37% percent and
saved the county over one million dollars in the first eight months, leading
Multnomah county to expand the program countywide.60 In 2017, a pilot
program in New York City found that text message reminders alone
improved appearance rates by 26% percent.61 Two empirical studies have
each found that court reminders increase appearance rates.62 These
reminders can be a simple, cost-effective intervention to improve
appearance rates without disrupting peoples’ lives.
The success of these court reminder programs belies the notion that
missed court dates are primarily the result of defendants’ flight from justice
or willful disobedience of the courts. Rather, a working group on pretrial
reform from Santa Clara County, California found “many of those who
miss a court appearance do so for mundane reasons such as lack of reliable
transportation, illness, or inability to leave work or find childcare, rather

57

See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 23-1329(d-1)(1) (2016).
See STANDARDS ON PRETRIAL RELEASE § 4.3, commentary (NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL
SERVS. AGENCIES 2004), available at https://perma.cc/TP6H-F98Q.
59
MATT O’KEEFE, COURT APPEARANCE NOTIFICATION SYSTEM: 2007 ANALYSIS
HIGHLIGHTS 1–2 (2007), available at https://multco.us/file/26891/download [https://perma.
cc/PAH8-RUTL].
60
Id.
61
BRICE COOK ET AL., USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
OUTCOMES, UNIV. OF CHICAGO CRIME LAB & IDEAS 42, 4 (2018), https://www.courthouse
news.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/crim-just-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2RJ-L6AM].
62
Kristin Bechtel et al., supra note 10, at 460.
58
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than out of a desire to escape justice.”63 Because defendants miss court for
mundane reasons, mundane solutions might be the answer. Phone call
reminders, access to public transportation, or public childcare in the
courtroom are not only more humane than arrest warrants and jail time—
they are also likely to be more effective.
Community engagement and support is another untapped resource for
pretrial service agencies. Santa Clara County is in the process of
implementing a new pretrial program called Community Release.64 In this
program, defendants are released pretrial and choose a non-profit partner
organization in the community, such as a church or community group.65
This organization in turn promises to help support the person on release
through methods such as providing transportation to court, reminding the
person of upcoming court dates, and helping the person find a job or get the
treatment and services they need.66 Time will tell how the program fares,
but it could lead to greater community engagement with the criminal justice
system, improved pretrial outcomes, and improved community life and
public safety.
IV. PRINCIPLE 4: DON’T CHARGE FEES
The criminal justice system is a public good. Like highways, public
schools, and sanitation departments, its benefits redound to the entire
community and therefore the entire community should pay for it. All
aspects of the criminal justice system—police, prosecutors, public
defenders, judges, courts, pretrial services, probation, prisons and jails—
should be collectively funded through tax dollars. In many jurisdictions,
however, criminal justice “user fees” charged to defendants, inmates and
probationers have increased in number and size.67 These “user fees” are
common in the pretrial context.
63

CTY. OF SANTA CLARA BAIL AND RELEASE WORK GRP., supra note 9, at 2,
http://sccgov.iqm2.com/Citizens/FileOpen.aspx?Type=4&ID=153959&MeetingID=7200.
64
Silicon Valley De-Bug Leads the Charge on Criminal Justice Reform, ROSENBERG
FOUND.: NEWS (Feb. 17, 2018), https://rosenbergfound.org/silicon-valley-de-bug-leads-thecharge-on-criminal-justice-reform/ [https://perma.cc/95NK-ZU7B]; CTY. OF SANTA CLARA
BAIL AND RELEASE WORK GRP., supra note 9, at 63–64.
65
CTY. OF SANTA CLARA BAIL AND RELEASE WORK GRP., supra note 9, at 64.
66
Silicon Valley De-Bug Leads the Charge on Criminal Justice Reform, ROSENBERG
FOUND.: NEWS (Feb. 17, 2018), https://rosenbergfound.org/silicon-valley-de-bug-leads-thecharge-on-criminal-justice-reform/; see also CTY. OF SANTA CLARA BAIL AND RELEASE
WORK GRP., supra note 9, at 63.
67
See ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A
BARRIER TO REENTRY 7 (2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees
%20and20Fines%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9HJ-FNJE].
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For example, judges in some jurisdictions condition pretrial release on
the defendant’s submission to regular drug testing.68 Defendants in many
jurisdictions are charged fees between $15 and $20 per test.69 Some
jurisdictions charge defendants a fee for pretrial supervision.70 For
example, in Indiana, a defendant may be charged an initial pretrial service
fee of $100, a monthly fee of $30, and an additional administrative fee of
$100.71 Almost every state72 charges defendants fees for electronic
monitoring, which can run as high as $900 per month.73
Some states permit or even require judges to consider a defendant’s
financial circumstances when setting conditions of release and to waive or
reduce fees for indigent defendants.74 But those provisions are rare.75 If an
individual fails to pay fees associated with pretrial conditions of release,
that individual may be subject to rearrest and detention for violating her
conditions of release. 76 Thus, just as with the money bail system,
68

See, e.g., COURT SERVS. AND OFFENDER SUPERVISION AGENCY FOR D.C., FY 2016
AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT 20 (2016).
69
See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS, https://www.tarrant
county.com/en/pretrial-services/frequently-asked-questions.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/ZR5Q-7MYE] ($16 fee for each pretrial drug test); Pretrial Reform in
Kentucky, Admin. Office of the Courts, Kentucky Court of Justice at 6 (Jan. 2013) (source
on file with author) (Kentucky imposes “costly” fees on defendants for pretrial drug testing);
Santa Clara County Office of Pretrial Services, Instructions for Random Drug Testing,
https://www.sccgov.org/sites/pretrial/Services/Forms/Documents/Female%20Drug%20Test
%20Instructions.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LL8-NAZG] ($15 fee for drug testing).
70
E.g. Ind. Code § 35-33-8-3.3 (2018). See also Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.01.160(2)
(2018) (defendant may be charged supervision fees); Fla. Stat. § 948.09 (2018) (imposing
fees for pretrial supervision). But see Court Guidelines, MASS.GOV (Nov, 2016),
http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/trial-court/pre-trial-release-guidelines.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N85S-V5JT] (Massachusetts does not charge fees for supervision as a
condition of pretrial release).
71
Ind. Code § 35-33-8-3.3.
72
State-By-State Court Fees, NPR (May 19, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/31
2455680/state-by-state-court-fees [https://perma.cc/S5G3-K8B4].
73
Eric Markowitz, Chain Gang 2.0: If You Can’t Afford This GPS Ankle Bracelet, You
Get Thrown in Jail, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015, 7:55 AM), http://www.ibtimes.
com/chain-gang-20-if-you-cant-afford-gps-ankle-bracelet-you-get-thrown-jail-2065283
[https://perma.cc/2XCP-MUJN]; Sukey Lewis, Electronic Monitoring of Defendants is
Increasing, But at What Price?¸ KQED NEWS (Aug. 2, 2017), https://ww2.kqed.org/news/
2017/08/02/electronic-monitoring-of-defendants-is-increasing-but-at-what-price/
[https://perma.cc/Z4KJ-R6KF].
74
See, e.g., W. Va. Code § 62-11C-7(a) (requiring judge to consider a defendant’s
ability to pay before setting a pretrial supervision fee).
75
See generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM AT HARVARD LAW SCH., STATE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT REFORM BUILDER, https://cjdebtreform.org/ [https://perma.
cc/QBN4-Q28L].
76
Markowitz, supra note 73; see also, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 23-1329.
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conditions of pretrial release can render an individual’s pretrial liberty
contingent on her financial circumstances.
The Supreme Court held in Bearden v. Georgia that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the revocation of probation for failure to pay a fine
absent a showing that the failure was willful: “If the probationer could not
pay despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the
court must consider alternative measures of punishment other than
imprisonment.” 77
The Court acknowledged the government’s
“fundamental interest in appropriately punishing persons,” but concluded
that it would be “fundamentally unfair” to imprison a probationer who
failed to pay a fine “through no fault of his own” and despite “all
reasonable efforts.”78 This reasoning applies with even greater force in the
pretrial context when the defendant’s liberty interest is stronger because she
has not yet been convicted of a crime and when the government’s
countervailing interest in punishment is therefore absent.79
Fee-based conditions of confinement may also induce defendants to
plead guilty to avoid continued financial obligations. Researchers have
observed this phenomenon in the bail context, where defendants agree to
plead guilty for time served to get out of jail80—one study found that
misdemeanor defendants who are detained pretrial are 25% more likely
than similarly situated released defendants to plead guilty.81 Releasees who
owe fees for pretrial services may feel inclined to plead guilty in order to
stop the charges from accumulating.82 In some cases it may be cheaper and
therefore preferable to be on probation after having pled guilty than on
electronic monitoring.83 Although this phenomenon has been noted
anecdotally in the press,84 more rigorous study is needed to fully understand
the scope and magnitude of the problem.

77

Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983).
Id. at 668–69.
79
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755.
80
Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial
Detention 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 714–15 (2017).
81
Id.
82
Lewis, supra note 73; Derek Gilna, Electronic Monitoring Becomes More
Widespread, but Problems Persist, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.prison
legalnews.org/news/2017/oct/9/electronic-monitoring-becomes-more-widespread-problemspersist/[https://perma.cc/MWR8-UA4S]
83
Markowitz, supra note 73.
84
Eric Markowitz, Electronic Monitoring Has Become the New Debtors Prison,
NEWSWEEK (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/2015/12/04/electronic-monitoringhas-become-new-debtors-prison-397225.html [https://perma.cc/Q93J-RHNM]; Gilna, supra
note 82.
78
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The practice of charging defendants to fulfill the conditions of their
release may be distorting sound policy decision-making. By externalizing
the expense of pretrial services onto defendants, system actors do not have
to find money in their budget to impose burdensome pretrial conditions.
Private companies that contract with jurisdictions to provide services such
as electronic monitoring boast that their services come at no cost to the
jurisdiction.85 Because pretrial programs are funded through user fees
rather than local budgets, policymakers are never forced to weigh the
expense of pretrial conditions against the public safety benefits they
provide, or to create policies that narrowly tailor the imposition of the most
expensive and burdensome conditions. They have neither the incentive to
evaluate the effectiveness of those services nor a fiscal reason to constrain
their application. In some cases, governments may actually profit from
charging fees for pretrial services.86 This creates an impermissible conflict
of interest and a perverse incentive to maximize both the number of
defendants who receive fee-based conditions and the number of fee-based
conditions a defendant receives.
It is not just governments that profit from pretrial services: across the
country, jurisdictions contract with for-profit companies to provide
electronic monitoring, drug testing, and other services. These companies
make their money from charging fees to pretrial defendants, indeed many of
them have defendant payment portals on their websites.87 Private vendors
have an incentive to expand the use of their services as broadly as
possible,88 and they have lobbying arms that protect and expand their

85

See, e.g., OFFENDER MANAGEMENT SERVICES, About Us, OFFENDER MANAGEMENT
SERVICES, http://offender-management.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/P8EW-QMH6] (last
visited Jul. 30, 2018).
86
Markowitz, supra note 84.
87
See, e.g., OFFENDER MANAGEMENT SERVICES, About Us, OFFENDER MANAGEMENT
SERVICES, http://offender-management.com/payments/ [https://perma.cc/PQW5-TTSL] (last
visited Jul. 30, 2018); SCRAM NORTH CAROLINA, http://www.scramnorthcarolina.com/govpay-net [https://perma.cc/E6WQ-XC55] (last visited Jul. 30, 2018). The website of a
prominent vendor of alcohol monitoring technology, Scram Systems, explains in its profile
of one jurisdiction that the county charges user fees that must be paid in advance in cash to
cover daily monitoring costs. “Offenders are required to pay 1 to 2 weeks in advance, in
cash, and are not allowed to fall behind in their payments. Nonpayment is considered a
violation of the offender’s release and managed accordingly.” SCRAM SYSTEMS, Case
Studies: Burleigh County Sheriff Uses Continuous Monitoring for an Effect 24/7 Sobriety
Program, SCRAM SYSTEMS, https://www.scramsystems.com/case-studies/burleigh-countysheriff-uses-continuous-alcohol-monitoring-for-an-effective/ [https://perma.cc/BV8S-U8VS]
(last visited Jul. 30, 2018).
88
See Avalana K. Eisenberg, Mass Monitoring, 124 S. CAL. L. REV. 123, 174 (2017).
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business model.89 The rising political influence of private pretrial services
vendors calls to mind the powerful influence that bail bond industry
lobbyists have on policymaking, which implicates money bail.90 Indeed, as
bail reform gains momentum, bail bond companies recognize that their
business model may be short-lived, and some are turning to pretrial services
as an alternative.91 Eliminating fees for pretrial services would remove
some of the profit motive and could help mitigate the distortion in
policymaking that it brings.
V. PRINCIPLE 5: CONDITIONS OF RELEASE AND RESTRICTIONS ON
LIBERTY SHOULD BE EVIDENCE BASED
Policy reform should always be informed by data and research. This is
especially true in the pretrial context, where public safety and the liberty of
presumptively innocent individuals are at stake. Troublingly, many
conditions of release and forms of pretrial supervision currently in use have
not been proven to be effective, or, in some cases, subject to
methodologically sound study.92 Policymakers should closely consider the
research, or lack thereof, before implementing pretrial release conditions.
And courts and pretrial services agencies should implement robust data
collection protocols that will enable them to internally track the success of
certain release conditions and that will enable independent researchers to
analyze their effectiveness.
Pretrial drug testing has not been shown to increase appearance rates
or decrease pretrial arrest.93 Randomized control trials have shown that

89
Eric Markowitz, Electronic Monitoring Has Become the New Debtors Prison,
NEWSWEEK (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/2015/12/04/electronic-monitoringhas-become-new-debtors-prison-397225.html [https://perma.cc/UJ9H-JNUB].
90
Gillian B. White, Who Really Makes Money Off Bail Bonds?, THE ATLANTIC (May 12,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/05/bail-bonds/526542/ [https://pe
rma.cc/RSW5-H7PR].
91
Dave Flessner, Tennessee Recovery and Monitoring Offers Jail Alternative, TIMES
FREE PRESS (Sept. 24, 2017), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/business/aroundregion/
story/2017/sep/24/jail-alternativecompany-monitors-pre-trial-or/450332/
[https://perma.cc/52ZK-2KPR]; Renee K. Gadoua, Tennessee County Uses CPS Technology,
But Skepticism Surrounds Effectiveness, BIG MOUNTAIN DATA (Aug. 18, 2015),
http://www.bigmountaindata.com/tennessee-county-uses-gps-technology-but-skepticismsurrounds-effectiveness/ https://perma.cc/JZ3F-85CP].
92
Kristin Bechtel, et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Pretrial Research: Risk Assessment,
Bond Type, and Interventions, 42 AM. CRIM. JUST. 443, 448–50, 460–61 (2017).
93
See MARIE VANNOSTRAND, KENNETH R. ROSE & KIMBERLY WEIBRECHT, STATE OF
THE SCIENCE OF PRETRIAL RELEASE RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUPERVISION 20–24 (2011).
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pretrial drug testing made no difference in either metric.94 Indeed, one
study actually found that for high risk defendants, drug testing made no
difference in pretrial success rates, but for lower risk defendants, pretrial
drug testing actually lowered pretrial success.95 Another study found drug
testing to be effective in reducing reincarceration of people on probation,96
but subsequent studies have not been able to replicate those findings.97 In
any event, research in the probation context does not address one of the
primary indicators of success in the pretrial context: improvement in
defendant appearance rates.
Pretrial supervision practices involving meetings with a pretrial officer
vary widely across jurisdictions and there is a dearth of systematic research
demonstrating the effectiveness of particular supervision models.98 Two
small experimental studies showed that pretrial supervision had no effect on
appearance or rearrest rates.99
Although one study found some
improvement in pretrial appearance rates from pretrial supervision, that
study covered multiple jurisdictions with different pretrial supervision
practices and was correlational, which is much weaker than a randomized
control trial.100 There are some strong studies of supervision in the
94
John S. Goldkamp & Peter R. Jones, Pretrial Drug-Testing Experiments in Milwaukee
and Prince George’s County: The Context of Implementation, 29 J. RES. CRIME DELINQ. 430,
457–59 (1992); Mary A. Toborg et al., Assessment of Pretrial Urine Testing in the District
of Columbia 14 (1989), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/119968N
CJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4AU-D4ZD]. See also Stefan Kapsch & Louis Sweeny,
Multnomah County DMDA Project: Evaluation Final Report (1990).
95
Marie VanNostrand & Gina Keebler, Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal Court,
31Washington, Office of Federal Detention Trustee (2009).
96
Angela Hawken & Mark Kleiman, Managing Drug Involved Probationers with Swift
and Certain Sanctions: Evaluating Hawaii’s HOPE 4 (2009), available at https://www.ncjrs
.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/229023.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SN5-XSS7].
97
Pamela K. Lattimore et al., Outcome Findings from the HOPE Demonstration Field
Experiment: Is Swift, Certain, and Fair an Effective Supervision Strategy?, 15 CRIM. & PUB.
POL’Y 1103, 1104 (2016); Daniel J. O’Connell et al., Decide Your Time: A Randomized
Trial of Drug Testing and Graduated Sanctions Program for Probationers, 15 CRIM. & PUB.
POL’Y 1–73, 1086 (2016).
98
See Marie VanNostrand, Kenneth R. Rose & Kimberly Weibrecht, State of the
Science of Pretrial Release Recommendations and Supervision, 32 (2011); Megan Stevenson
& Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 42–44
(2017).
99
James Austin, Barry Krisberg & Paul Litsky, The Effectiveness of Supervised Pretrial
Release, 31 CRIME AND DELINQ. 519, 523–35 (1985); John S. Goldkamp & Michael D.
White, Restoring Accountability in Pretrial Release: The Philadelphia Pretrial Release
Supervision Experiments, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 143, 154 (2006).
100
CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP & MARIE VANNOSTRAND, EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF
PRETRIAL SUPERVISION ON PRETRIAL OUTCOMES, 15–16 (2013); see also Megan Stevenson &
Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 43 (2017).
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probation and parole context that show that required meetings have no
effect on new criminal activity, but do tend to increase technical
violations.101
There is a lack of sound research about the effectiveness of electronic
monitoring in the pretrial context.102 The research that does exist has not
found that electronic monitoring improves pretrial outcomes.103 One
jurisdiction found that defendants released pretrial with electronic
monitoring had similar failure to appear and new arrest rates as those
released without electronic monitoring, and those on electronic monitoring
actually experienced more technical violations than those without electronic
monitoring.104 One problem with the existing research is that there have
been no randomized control trials. Moreover, observational research
suffers from the problem that individuals who are put on electronic
monitoring are usually considered higher risk than those individuals who
are released without electronic monitoring.105
Notably, text message court reminders are the one pretrial intervention
with a proven track record of success.106 One study found through a
randomized control trial that text message court reminders reduced failure
to appear rates by 26%.107 Hypothesizing that people did not make a
deliberate decision to miss court dates, researchers decided to test a
behavioral intervention (text message reminders) rather than an

101
See Geoffrey C. Barnes et al., Low-Intensity Community Supervision for Low-Risk
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enforcement intervention (increasing the penalty for failing to appear). 108
The results of the study confirmed that simply reminding people of their
court date can lead to significantly higher appearance rates.109
Courts and policymakers should prioritize conditions of release that
have been proven effective through rigorous study. But they should also
take steps to understand the effectiveness of their own policies.
Jurisdictions should adopt thorough data collection practices that allow
them to track and analyze case outcomes in which various conditions of
release are imposed. They should also make this data available to
independent researchers to improve our collective understanding of the
effectiveness of release conditions.
CONCLUSION
The current momentum behind money bail reform holds much promise
for a more just and effective pretrial system. But there is a risk that
imposing excessive conditions of release will reproduce some of the harms
of money bail. The five principles of pretrial release outlined above offer a
roadmap to lasting pretrial reform that avoids replicating some of the
injustices of money bail.
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